A short review of the historical critique of usury

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Abstract

Usury – lending at interest or excessive interest – has, according to known records, been practised in various parts of the world for at least four thousand years. During this time, there is substantial evidence of intense criticism by various traditions, institutions and social reformers on moral, ethical, religious and legal grounds. The rationale employed by these wide-ranging critics have included arguments about work ethic, social justice, economic instability, ecological destruction and inter-generational equity. While the contemporary relevance of these largely historical debates is not analysed in detail, the authors contend that their significance is greater than ever before in the context of the modern interest-based global economy.

Keywords: usury; interest; debt; discounting; Islamic banking

Introduction

The concept of ‘usury’ has a long historical life, throughout most of which it has been understood to refer to the practice of charging financial interest in excess of the principal amount of a loan, although in some instances, and more especially in more recent times, it has been interpreted as interest above the legal or socially acceptable rate. Accepting this broad definition for the moment, the practice of usury can be traced back approximately four thousand years (Jain, 1929), and during its subsequent history it has been repeatedly condemned, prohibited, scorned and restricted, mainly on moral, ethical, religious and legal grounds. Among its most visible and vocal critics have been the religious institutions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam and Christianity. To this list may be added ancient Western
philosophers and politicians, as well as various modern socio-economic reformers. It is the objective of this paper to outline briefly the history of this critique of usury, to examine reasons for its repeated denouncement and to assess intuitively the relevance of these arguments to today’s predominantly interest-based global economy. The scope will not extend to a full exploration of some of the proposed modern alternatives to usury, except to describe the growing practice of Islamic banking as an example.

**History of the critique of usury**

*Usury in Hinduism and Buddhism*

Among the oldest known references to usury are those to be found in ancient Indian religious manuscripts and Jain (1929) provides an excellent summary of these in his work on *Indigenous Banking in India*. The earliest such record derives from the *Vedic* texts of Ancient India (2000–1400 BC) in which the ‘usurer’ (*kusidin*) is mentioned several times and interpreted as any lender at interest. More frequent and detailed references to interest payment are to be found in the later *Sutra* texts (700–100 BC), as well as the Buddhist *Jatakas* (600–400 BC). It is during this latter period that the first sentiments of contempt for usury are expressed. For example, Vasishtha, a well-known Hindu law-maker of that time, made a special law which forbade the higher castes of *Brahmanas* (priests) and *Kshatriyas* (warriors) from being usurers or lenders at interest. Also, in the *Jatakas*, usury is referred to in a demeaning manner: ‘hypocritical ascetics are accused of practising it’.

By the second century AD, however, usury had become a more relative term, as is implied in the *Laws of Manu* of that time: ‘Stipulated interest beyond the legal rate being against [the law], cannot be recovered: they call that a usurious way (of lending)’ (Jain, 1929: 3–10). This dilution of the concept of usury seems to have continued through the remaining course of Indian history so that today, while it is still condemned in principle, usury refers only to interest charged above the prevailing socially accepted range and is no longer prohibited or controlled in any significant way.

*Usury in Ancient Western political philosophy*

Among the Ancient Western philosophers who condemned usury can be named Plato, Aristotle, the two Catos, Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch (Birnie, 1958). Evidence that these sentiments found their concurrent manifestation in the civil law of that period can be seen, for example, from the *Lex Genucia* reforms in Republican Rome (340 BC) which outlawed interest altogether. Nevertheless, in practice, ways of evading such legislation were
found and, by the last period of the Republic, usury was once again rife. It was the Democratic party in Rome who re-dedicated themselves to the cause of those suffering the burden of debt, and, under the banner of Julius Caesar, a ceiling on interest rates of 12 per cent was set, and later, under Justinian, this was lowered to between 4 per cent and 8 per cent (Birnie, 1958). Clearly, this left fertile ground for the assault on usury which the Church would mount following its Christianization of the Roman Empire.

Usury in Islam

The criticism of usury in Islam was well established during the Prophet Mohammed's life and reinforced by various of his teachings in the Holy Quran dating back to around AD 600. The original word used for usury in this text was riba which literally means 'excess or addition'. This was accepted as referring directly to interest on loans so that, according to Islamic economists Choudhury and Malik (1992), by the time of Caliph Ulmar, the prohibition of interest was a well-established working principle integrated into the Islamic economic system. It is not true that this interpretation of usury has been universally accepted or applied in the Islamic world. Indeed, a school of Islamic thought which emerged in the nineteenth century, led by Sir Sayyed, still argues for an interpretative differentiation between usury, which, it is claimed, refers to consumitional lending, and interest, which, they say, refers to lending for commercial investment (Ahmad, 1958).

Nevertheless, there does seem to be evidence in modern times for what Choudhury and Malik describe as 'a gradual evolution of the institutions of interest-free financial enterprises across the world' (1992: 104). They cite, for instance, the current existence of financial institutions in Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the Dar-al-Mal-al-Islami in Geneva and Islamic trust companies in North America. This growing practice of Islamic banking will be discussed more fully in a later section as a modern application of usury prohibition.

Usury in Judaism

Criticism of usury in Judaism has its roots in several biblical passages in which the taking of interest is forbidden, discouraged or scorned. The Hebrew word for interest is neshekh, literally meaning 'a bite' and is believed to refer to the exaction of interest from the point of view of the debtor. In the associated Exodus and Leviticus texts, the word almost certainly applies only to lending to the poor and destitute, while in Deuteronomy the prohibition is extended to include all moneylending other than business dealings with foreigners. In the Levitical text, the
words *tarbit* or *marbit* are also used to refer to the recovery of interest by the creditor.

In addition to these biblical roots are various talmudic extensions of the prohibitions of interest, known as *avak ribbit*, literally ‘the dust of interest’ which apply, for example, to certain types of sales, rent and work contracts. This is distinguished from *rubbit kezuzah*, interest proper in an amount or at a rate agreed upon between lender and borrower. The difference in law is that the latter, if it has been paid by the borrower to the lender, is recoverable from the lender, while the former, once paid, is not recoverable, although a contract tainted by the dust of interest will not be enforced. (*The Jewish Encyclopedia*, 1912).

Despite the prohibition on taking interest, there is considerable evidence to suggest that this rule was not widely observed in biblical times. In addition to several references in the Old Testament to creditors being exacting and implacable in their extraction of interest, from the Elephantine papyri it appears that among the Jews in Egypt in the fifth century BCE it was a matter of course that interest would be charged on loans (*Encyclopedia Judaica*, 1971). This charitable nature of the prohibition on interest suggests that its violation was regarded not as a criminal offence with penal sanctions attached but as a moral transgression.

The phenomenon of evasion can also be partly explained by changing economic conditions, beginning in the Amoraic period in Babylonia when interest prohibition was held to be no longer compatible with the economic needs of the community. In time, a standard form of legalization of interest was established, known as *hetter iskah*, meaning the permission to form a partnership, which has become so accepted that nowadays all interest transactions are freely carried out in accordance with Jewish law, by simply adding to the note or contract concerned the words *al-pi hetter iskah*. (*Encyclopedia Judaica*, 1971).

**Usury in Christianity**

Despite its Judaic roots, the critique of usury was most fervently taken up as a cause by the institutions of the Christian Church where the debate prevailed with great intensity for well over a thousand years. The Old Testament decrees were resurrected and a New Testament reference to usury added to fuel the case. Building on the authority of these texts, the Roman Catholic Church had, by the fourth century AD, prohibited the taking of interest by the clergy, a rule which they extended in the fifth century to the laity. In the eighth century under Charlemagne, they pressed further and declared usury to be a general criminal offence. This anti-usury movement continued to gain momentum during the early Middle Ages and perhaps reached its zenith in 1311 when Pope Clement V made the ban on usury absolute and declared all secular legislation in its favour null and void (Birnie, 1952).
Increasingly thereafter, and despite numerous subsequent prohibitions by Popes and civil legislators, loopholes in the law and contradictions in the Church’s arguments were found and, along with the growing tide of commercialization, the pro-usury counter-movement began to grow. The rise of Protestantism and its pro-capitalism influence is also associated with this change (McGrath, 1990), but it should be noted that both Luther and Calvin expressed some reservations about the practice of usury despite their belief that it could not be universally condemned. Calvin, for instance, enumerated seven crucial instances in which interest remained ‘sinful’, but these have been generally ignored and his stance taken as a wholesale sanctioning of interest (Birnie, 1952). As a result of all these influences, sometime around 1620, according to the theologian Ruston, ‘usury passed from being an offence against public morality which a Christian government was expected to suppress to being a matter of private conscience [and] a new generation of Christian moralists redefined usury as excessive interest’ (1993: 173–4).

This position has remained pervasive through to present-day thinking in the Church, as the indicative views of the Church of Scotland (1988) suggest when it declares in its study report on the ethics of investment and banking: ‘We accept that the practice of charging interest for business and personal loans is not, in itself, incompatible with Christian ethics. What is more difficult to determine is whether the interest rate charged is fair or excessive’. Similarly, it is illustrative that, in contrast to the clear moral injunction against usury still expressed by the Church in Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 *Rerum Novarum* as ‘voracious usury . . . an evil condemned frequently by the Church but nevertheless still practised in deceptive ways by avaricious men’, Pope John Paul II’s 1989 *Soliitudine Rei Socialis* lacks any explicit mention of usury except the vaguest implication by way of acknowledging the Third World Debt crisis.

**Usury in modern reformist thinking**

Some may be surprised to discover that Adam Smith, despite his image as the ‘Father of the Free-market Capitalism’ and his advocacy of *laissez-fair* economics, came out strongly in support of controlling usury (Jadlow, 1977; Levy, 1987). While he opposed a complete prohibition of interest, he was in favour of the imposition of an interest-rate ceiling. This, he felt, would ensure that low-risk borrowers who were likely to undertake socially beneficial investments were not deprived of funds as a result of ‘the greater part of the money which was to be lent [being] lent to prodigals and projectors [investors in risky, speculative ventures], who alone would be willing to give [an unregulated] high interest rate’ (Smith, 1937: 339).
The great twentieth-century economist John Maynard Keynes held a similar position, believing that 'the disquisitions of the schoolmen [on usury] were directed towards elucidation of a formula which should allow the schedule of the marginal efficiency to be high, whilst using rule and custom and the moral law to keep down the rate of interest, so that a wise Government is concerned to curb it by statute and custom and even by invoking the sanctions of the Moral Law' (1936: 351–3).

Another less well-known anti-usury economic reformist was Silvio Gesell (1904), yet Keynes wrote that the world could learn more from him than from Marx. Gesell, as a successful nineteenth-century merchant in Germany and Argentina, condemned interest on the basis that his sales were more often related to the 'price' of money (i.e. interest) than people's needs or the quality of his products. His proposal of making money a public service subject to a use fee led to widespread experimentation in Austria, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and the United States under the banner of the so-called 'stamp script movement', but these initiatives were all squashed when their success began to threaten the national banking monopolies (Kennedy, 1995). Margrit Kennedy, a German professor at the University of Hanover, is one of the most vocal contemporary critics of interest; she builds on Gesell’s ideas, believing that ‘interest . . . acts like cancer in our social structure’. She takes up the cause for ‘interest and inflation-free money’ by suggesting a modification of banking practice to incorporate a circulation fee on money, acting somewhat like a negative interest rate mechanism.

Finally, another school of modern interest critics have their roots in the complementary work of several socio-economic reformists of the early twentieth century, namely Douglas (1924), Fisher (1933), Simons (1948) and Soddy (1926). Their chief common premise was that it is completely wrong and unacceptable for commercial banks to hold a monopoly on the money or credit creation process. For banks then to charge interest (including to government) on money which they had in the first place created out of nothing, having suffered no opportunity cost or sacrifice, amounted to nothing less than immoral and fraudulent practice. Various alternative systems are proposed by the original authors and carried forward by their modern-day torch-bearers, for example, the Social Credit Secretariat and the Committee on Monetary and Economic Reform.

Rationale for the critique of usury

Throughout the history of the criticism of usury, various reasons and rationales have been forwarded in support of this position. While some are unique to particular traditions or individuals, many tread on common ground which this section will briefly attempt to synthesize.
Usury as unearned income

The Church’s simplest and perhaps earliest objection to usury was on the basis that it constituted unearned income, an idea which stemmed from its general doctrine of Just Price. The Lateran Council of 1515 clearly expressed such a view by the Church: ‘This is the proper interpretation of usury when gain is sought to be acquired from the use of a thing, not in itself fruitful (such as a flock or a field) without labour, expense or risk on the part of the lender’. Birnie reinforces this point by noting that ‘to live without labour was denounced as unnatural, and so Dante put usurers in the same circle of hell as the inhabitants of Sodom and other practisers of unnatural vice’ (1952: 4).

This is also the rationale Ahmad uses to explain why, in Islam, God ‘permits trade yet forbids usury’: ‘The difference is that profits are the result of initiative, enterprise and efficiency. They result after a definite value-creating process. Not so with interest’; also, ‘interest is fixed, profit fluctuates. In the case of interest you know your return and can be sure of it. In the case of profit you have to work to ensure it’ (1958: 25). Perhaps Aristotle had similar sentiments in mind when he argued that ‘a piece of money cannot beget another’.

There is an important psycho-political dimension to this argument. Keynes’ biographer, Skidelsky, intriguingly comments on ‘Keynes’s sense that, at some level too deep to be captured by mathematics, “love of money” as an end, not a means, is at the root of the world’s economic problem’ (1992: 454). Hence, at a fundamental level of analysis, the so-called evils of usury must be understood as being connected with money being a social psychological construct legitimized by the power dynamics of a given political economy which may or may not be democratically and consciously legitimatized. An illustration of this understanding can be seen in the Christian tradition where Jesus is asked whether taxes should be paid to Caesar. Before uttering the famous words, ‘Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s’, he tellingly first asks to be shown a coin and inquires, ‘Whose image and superscription hath it?’ (Luke 20:24). In other words, ‘What power structure legitimises this currency?’ Jesus’s response therefore said much more than merely ‘pay your taxes’. It invited questioning of the very psycho-spiritual power dynamics that constitute the deep roots of human relationship in economy, and which have always caused matters of political economy to be central to prophetic witness.

Usury is what marks the distinction between money being simply a socially contracted abstract mechanism to lubricate the interaction between supply and demand, and money as an end in itself. As an end in itself, as a social commodity legitimizised through usury to tax other economic activity, the honest process of living by the sweat of one’s brow is short-circuited. The true dignity and full reward of ordinary labour is compromised. Money thus becomes self-perpetuating power in itself
rather than just a mediating agent of power. And it is the relentlessness of compound interest in the face of adversity that sets the potential cruelty of usury apart from equity-based return on investment. Resonant with Skidelsky's comment about Keynes, one can see how it is the love of money as an end in itself, not the use of money itself, that is said to be the root of all evil (1 Timothy 6). It was in recognition of the need to have corrective feedback mechanisms that Islam not only issues injunctions against usury, but also imposes Zakat or a wealth tax. And, more radical still, the Old Testament proposes a complete economic readjustment through the 'Jubilee' process every fifty years (Leviticus 25), though there is no evidence that such wholesale redistribution of wealth in all forms was ever actually carried out. Perhaps it is a prophetic vision whose time has yet to come.

**Usury as double billing**

A slightly more obscure rationale was employed by the Church later in the Middle Ages in order to strengthen its anti-usury doctrine. Drawing on some of the concepts of Civil Law, it argued that money was a consumable good (*fungible*), for which the ownership passed from lender to borrower in the course of the loan transaction (*mutuum*), with the fair price of 'sale' therefore being the exact amount of the money advanced. Hence to ask for more in the form of interest was illegal and immoral, 'like selling a loaf of bread and then charging in addition for the use of it' (Birnie, 1952: 6). Or, as Aquinas intimated in his *Summa Theologica*, it would be to sell the same thing twice (Ruston, 1993).

**Usury as exploitation of the needy**

The condemnation of usury in the form of charging for loans to the poor and destitute is a recurring theme in several traditions. This is clearly the contextual meaning of the Judaic biblical passages in Exodus and Leviticus (*Encyclopedia Judaica*, 1971) and Ruston suggests that 'the original target of the medieval usury laws was the medieval equivalent of the "loan shark" [but that] the medieval theory was unsatisfactory because it could not distinguish the helpful loan from the oppressive' (1993: 173). Sir Sayyed's school in Islam similarly interprets *riba* as 'the primitive form of money-lending when money was advanced for consummational purposes' (Ahmad, 1958: 21). In the Indian tradition, this understanding of usury can be also found, as is evident from this twentieth-century quote: 'It is Usury - the rankest, most extortionate, most merciless Usury - which eats the marrow out of the bones of the *raiyat* [cultivators] and condemns him to a life of penury and slavery' (Jain, 1929: 110–11).

Ruston (1993) claims that usury as exploitation of the needy still exists in modern times. He cites as an example the findings of a 1992 Policy
A short review of the historical critique of usury

Studies Institute report which concludes that the poor pay more in absolute terms for their money, while seeking credit only for absolute necessities rather than to finance the acquisition of luxury goods which they cannot afford. This is borne out by a recent study by the National Consumer Council (1995) on financial services and low-income consumers; as one respondent put it: 'It's like being caught, gotcha, and then they [the banks/lenders] start winding you in.' Hence, the poor have to sweat doubly so that the rich might live on interest.

A parallel modern argument relates to the devastating social impact of the so-called 'Third World debt crisis', a situation which Pope John Paul II (1989) acknowledges in his Sollicitudo Rei Socialis when he states: 'Capital needed by the debtor nations to improve their standard of living now has to be used for interest payments on their debts'. This critical modern manifestation of usury is dealt with in more depth and detail in the comprehensive works of Susan George, A Fate Worse Than Debt (1988) and The Debt Boomerang (1992), among numerous others. For now, it is only worth pointing out to critics of the Islamic interest-free banking system that, if sovereign debt during the 1970s had been advanced on an equity investment basis, debtor countries would not have been caught on the rack of compounding interest at rates established by non-domestic macroeconomic factors. Servicing costs could not have burgeoned while at the same time most commodity prices paid to debtor nations collapsed. Return on capital and perhaps capital repayment itself, being commensurate with a nation's economic well-being, would have fluctuated in accordance with ability to pay. The debtor nations would have enjoyed fiscal security akin to that of a low-geared company. Of course, the fact that much sovereign debt comprised recycled dollars from oil-producing Muslim countries is an irony, and a disgrace, that should escape notice no more than eyes should be averted from the hypocrisy of usury-promoting countries such as Britain and the United States whose leaders often proclaim Christian values. Be that as it may, by applying the Islamic approach, a lot of human misery could have been avoided. Applying the same principle, this could be the case for the countless individuals and enterprises caught in the trap of impoverishment through non-sovereign debt.

Usury as a mechanism of inequitable redistribution of wealth

The observation that usury acts as a mechanism by which 'the rich get richer and the poor get poorer' is common to several traditions. Islam rejects financial interest on the basis that it contradicts the principle of distributive equity which its political economy strives to enshrine: 'Interest in any amount acts in transferring wealth from the assetless section of the population' (Choudhury and Malik, 1992: 51). Coming from a totally different perspective as a self-declared 'individualist', Birnie reaches a
similar conclusion: ‘Interest, by making capital a quasi-monopoly, effectually prevents the establishment of a true competitive system’ (1952: 1). Kennedy (1995) provides some excellent empirical evidence of this phenomenon which relates to Germany in 1982. She shows that, while the poorest 2.5 million households paid out (net) DM 1.8 billion in interest, the richest 2.5 million households received (net) DM 34.2 billion. She even goes on to suggest that this covert redistributive mechanism technically works against the constitutional rights of the individual in most countries, given that money is a government service to which the public should have equal access.

The psychological effect of this on the relatively poor can be seen to be magnified when merely quantitative evaluation of transfers from poor to rich is superseded by consideration of the qualitative cost of such a wealth transfer. For the relatively rich, the utility gain provided by usury is marginal to the already substantial utility of the principal sum. The principle of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth therefore applies to each incremental unit of wealth procured by interest earnings. The poor, however, experience the converse of this. For them, the loss in utility incurred by having to pay interest is qualitatively much greater than the gain to the rich. Each unit of interest paid incurs increasing marginal utility loss. Permitting usury to operate in an economy therefore reduces overall utility in the economy. This must count as one of the strongest arguments against usury. Any justification of it as an efficient economic instrument would have to first demonstrate that it functions to increase total utility. In the absence of such demonstration, it can justifiably be condemned as a tool of tyranny.

Usury as an agent of economic instability

Gesell’s (1904) main objection to interest is that it is an endemic factor in the instability of interest-based economies, i.e. the cycles of boom and bust, recession and recovery. Similarly, Ahmad, arguing from an Islamic perspective, claims ‘the greatest problem in the capitalist economy is that of the crises [and] interest plays a peculiar part in bringing about the crises’ (1958: 36). Even Keynes, the campaigner for interest-based monetary policy, admits the fact that ‘the rate of interest is not self-adjusting at the level best suited to the social advantage but constantly tends to rise too high’ (1936: 350). Kennedy (1995) is bolder, suggesting that the compounded growth of interest may in fact cause inflation. She shows, for instance, how in Germany, while government income, Gross National Product and the salaries and wages of the average income earner rose by about 400 per cent between 1968 and 1989, the interest payments of the government rose by 1,360 per cent which, she claims, implies an inflationary effect.
Usury as discounting the future

The last reason cited for condemning usury relates to the concept and practice of discounting future values. Because compound interest results in an appreciation in invested monetary capital, it is presumed rational for people to prefer having a specified amount of currency now than the same amount some time in the future. This simple and rarely questioned logic has several disastrous implications. For instance, Pearce and Turner (1990) note that discounting affects the rate at which we use up natural resources - the higher the discount rate (derived partly from the interest rate), the faster the resources are likely to be depleted. Daly and Cobb (1990) take this observation to its logical conclusion and show that discounting can lead to the 'economically rational' extinction of a species, simply if the prevailing interest rate happens to be greater than the reproduction rate of the exploited species. Another consequence of the discounting principle, argued by Kula, is that 'in evaluating long term investment projects, particularly those in which the benefits and costs are separated from each other with a long time interval, the net present value rules guide the decision maker to maximise the utility of present generations at the expense of future ones' (1981: 899).

In this context it is fitting to observe that a key feature that distinguishes financial economy from nature's economy is that one operates on a compound interest basis, whereas the other is based on simple interest. Money deposited in the bank may yield 10 per cent plus interest on the compounded sum next year, but in nature, if you leave this year's crop of apples on the tree, you are unlikely to pick a compoundedly heavier crop next year. Accordingly, usury permits a disjunction between financial and ecological economy. The result is either the progressive destruction of nature or, in the absence of redistributive social justice, an inbuilt necessity for periodic financial crashes throughout history. The point is well made by the illustration that if Judas Iscariot had invested his thirty pieces of silver at just a few percentage points compound, repayable in silver as of today, the amount of silver required would be equivalent to the weight of the earth.

The implicit ethics, or dearth thereof, of discounting can be used to illustrate clearly why usury corrupts the natural world as well as social relations. For instance, consider the impact of net present value discounted cash-flow methodology in appraising the trade-off between natural and human-made capital which, over the fullness of time, can usually be justified only if the utility of future generations is discounted (McIntosh, 1996). This violates intergenerational equity - a key principle of sustainable development recognized by both the 1987 Brundtland Commission and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit of the United Nations. It also violates an age-old precept of right livelihood which flies in the face of the presumption of time value of money on which interest rates are based: that
is, it violates the presumption of many traditional land users that the land
should be handed on to the next generation in at least as good heart as it
was inherited from the forebears. Discounting, as the counterpoint of
usury, can be thus exposed as a rueful device employed to justify theft
of the children’s future. Exploration of the theoretical basis and practical
illustrations of this argument perhaps provides much scope for future
micro- and macro-economic research in ecological economics.

A modern application of usury prohibition

*Islamic banking*

A previous section on Islamic prohibition of usury made mention of the
rejection by Islam of financial interest or *riba*, largely on the grounds of
its negative distributive justice and equity effects (Khan, 1986). Out of
this prohibition has developed perhaps the most sophisticated and
complete theoretical system of interest-free political economy in the world
(Choudhury and Malik, 1992).

The specific methods for implementing Islamic banking have centred
around financial equity based approaches, most notably *Mudarabah* — a
joint venture between the bank and a ‘partner’ with both contributing to
the capital of the project and sharing the profit or loss — and *Musharakah*
— in which all the capital for an investment is provided by the bank in
return for a predetermined share of the profit or loss of the business
undertaking (Kahn and Mirakhor, 1986).

The first modern Islamic bank was established in the 1960s in Egypt
(*The Banker*, 1989) and, in the ensuing three decades, Islamic banking has
grown into an industry with $80 billion in deposits and 100 banks and
finance houses (Khalaf, 1995). Much of this growth has been as a result of
the comprehensive attempts by Iran, Pakistan and Sudan over the past ten
years to restructure their national banking systems to bring them into
accordance with Islamic law of the *Shari'ah* (Aftab, 1986; *The Economist*,
1992a). In addition, increasing numbers of banks outside these countries,
including in Western countries, have begun to offer parallel Islamic
banking services (O’Brien and Palmer, 1993). As recently as 1996, the UK
joined these latter ranks, with Flemmings Merchant Bank (1996) offering
the first Islamic banking service, the Oasis Fund, to British customers.

The claimed advantages of the Islamic banking approach to finance are
that it results in: more just and equitable distribution of resources; more
responsible and profitable lending due to the necessarily closer bank–client
relationship; less volatile business cycles; and more stable banking systems
(Taylor and Evans, 1987); as well as ‘the relative efficiency of the interest-
free money system over the alternative interest-based system’ (Darrat,
1988). On the other hand, the Islamic banking industry has been criticized
on a number of counts too: for its lack of uniformity and standardization of products, accounting systems and endorsements by different sharia boards (Khalaf, 1995); various bad-debt complications (Shreeve, 1988); the information-gathering burden on potential consumers and banks themselves to ensure the security and profitability of their funds, as well as, the lack of an interest-rate mechanism to use as a macro-economic tool (The Economist, 1992b). However, these limitations must be viewed against the backdrop of Islamic banking as a young and innovative growth market.

Conclusion

The preceding paper has attempted briefly to describe the extensive history of the critique of usury, and to crystallize and synthesize the main tenants of the arguments used in support of this position. The fact that we live in a global economic system which is more usurious/interest-based than ever before begs the question, therefore: Are any of these criticisms of the past either serious and convincing enough or currently relevant enough to merit a legitimate challenge to the status quo? In the authors’ opinion, every one of the reasons cited in the critique of usury, perhaps with the exception of ‘double billing’, seems more pressing and relevant now than ever. In particular, it is the belief of the authors that individuals or organizations in the West with money to invest, especially those which like to consider themselves as being ethical, might have, more to learn from Islam than is generally acknowledged. But first, society needs to be re-conscientized to the relevance of the age-old usury debate in modern times.

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Notes

1 Hence, ‘usury’ and ‘interest’ have been used interchangeably in this paper, except where interpretative difference occurred historically, in which case the relevant distinction will be made explicit. Also, ‘interest’ has been taken to refer to any real rate after inflation, bad-debt provision and administrative costs.

2 Most notable of these is Surah 2 verses 188, 274–80; Surah 3 verse 130; Surah 4 verses 29, 161; Surah 9 verses 34–5, 43; Surah 30 verse 39.


4 I Samuel 22: 2; II Kings 4: 1; Isaiah 50: 1.

5 For more first-hand detailed insight into the theological debate on usury, especially during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some republished original texts from that period include Blaxton (1634), Culpepper (1621), Fenton (1611), Smith (1591) and Wilson (1572).

6 Luke 6: 34.
While opinions on the correctness of doing so differ, the authors have presumed God and Allah to represent the same divine principle though expressed differently in the understanding of respective faiths.

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